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Temporal Parts and Temporary Intrinsics∗ 
 
 
 
1. This paper is concerned with a familiar problem that any account of 
the metaphysics of material objects must face. The problem I have in mind 
is what is known as the problem of temporary intrinsics, the problem of 
how objects can persist through change.1 A popular line of thought, 
endorsed by David Lewis (1986) among others, holds that if the 
Metaphysic of Temporal Parts—or the MTP, for short—is adopted, then 
the problem of temporary intrinsics can be adequately resolved.2 On this 
view, the problem of temporary intrinsics and the MTP are linked, at least 
in the following sense: the MTP provides a solution to the problem of 
temporary intrinsics, and so gives us reason for thinking that the MTP is 
true. 
Despite its attractiveness, however, I think this line of reasoning is 
flawed. To be sure, my dissatisfaction with the MTP is not original. For 
example, some philosophers have objected to the MTP on the grounds that 
they do not know what a temporal part is, and hence, that they find the 
MTP incomprehensible.3 Others have argued that the MTP makes genuine 
change impossible and is to be rejected for that reason.4 However, although 
                                                          
∗ I’d like to thank David Hunter and Zeno Swijtink for helpful criticism and advice on 
previous drafts. Thanks also to Henry Laycock, who provided me with vigorous 
comments at the 2001 meetings of the Canadian Philosophical Association where an 
ancestor of this paper was presented. 
 
1 In the terminology of David Lewis (see Lewis 1986, 202). See also Haslanger 
(1989). 
 
2 I owe the phrase ‘the Metaphysic of Temporal Parts’ to Judith Jarvis Thomson 
(1983). 
 
3 See Thomson (1983) for a statement of this view. 
 
4 See Mellor (1981) for a statement of this view. 
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I am sympathetic to these objections, my objection to the MTP will take a 
different form. What I wish to do is consider an objection that friends of 
the MTP press against other solutions to the problem of temporary 
intrinsics and turn it against the MTP itself. Thus, I will not be arguing that 
the MTP must be false, nor will I be arguing that there are no arguments in 
favor of the MTP.5 Rather, the conclusion I will draw will be conditional: 
if the MTP provides an adequate response to the problem of temporary 
intrinsics, then the MTP provides no reason to reject our commonsense 
view of the nature of material objects.6 
 
2. Let me begin with the problem of temporary intrinsics. In order to 
adequately discuss this problem, I first need to say what an intrinsic 
property is. The definition of ‘intrinsic property’ that I have in mind runs 
as follows: a property P is an intrinsic property of an object x if (i) 
whenever x has P, x’s having P does not entail the existence of a wholly 
distinct object y, and (ii) y’s existence is not contingent on the existence of 
x.7 So, for example, the property of being red is plausibly intrinsic, since 
whether or not an object is red does not entail the existence of any other 
object. The property of being married, on the other hand, is plausibly non-
intrinsic, since whether a person N is married does entail the existence of 
an object distinct from N, namely N’s spouse. If a property is non-intrinsic, 
I will also sometimes say that it is extrinsic, or relational, or derivative. 
 It is natural to suppose that some commonsense objects persist 
through changes in their intrinsic properties.8 I will focus on my car, which 
                                                          
5 Other arguments for the existence of temporal parts are the argument from Special 
Relativity, and the argument from Humean supervenience. For a discussion of the first 
sort of argument, see Rea (1998); for a discussion of the second, see again Rea (1998) 
and Haslanger (1994). 
 
6 I assume that our ordinary, commonsense view of the nature of material objects is 
that such objects are three-dimensional in nature, and that they persist by enduring. For 
further explanation of this terminology, see §5 below.  
 
7 See Lewis (1983) and Langton and Lewis (1998) for discussion of the proper 
definition of ‘intrinsic’. The notion of entailment I have in mind is the necessary truth 
preserving one. 
 
8 The following presentation of the problem of temporary intrinsics owes much to 
Haslanger (1989). 
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persisted through the loss of its radio, but any ordinary material object will 
do.9 More generally, then, we have the following principle about 
persistence: 
 
(P) Some commonsense objects persist through intrinsic change. 
 
If, however, my car persisted through the loss of its radio, then it would 
seem to follow that my car existed both before and after the loss of its 
radio. After all, it is my car that previously had a radio and presently lacks 
one. More generally, then, it seems right to say that if an object persists 
through a change in its intrinsic properties, then that object exists both 
before and after the change in question: 
 
(E) If an object O persists through a change C, then O exists both before 
and after C. 
 
Now, consider again my car. My car changed by losing the property 
of having a radio. Hence, from (P) and (E) it follows that there is some 
object with which my car is identical before losing its radio, and some 
object with which my car is identical after losing its radio. Let us call the 
object with which my car is said to be identical before losing its radio ‘car-
plus’, and let us call the object with which my car is said to be identical 
after losing its radio ‘car-minus’.10 The problem can therefore be 
reformulated as follows: is car-plus identical with car-minus? That is, is 
 
(ID) car-plus = car-minus 
 
true?  
 There is good reason to think that it is. For by (E), my car exists 
before losing its radio, and is identical with car-plus; and by (E) my car 
                                                          
9 I will use the property of having a radio as an example of an intrinsic property. This 
might seem odd, as it might be objected that an object O cannot have the property of 
having a radio unless there exists another, distinct, object, namely the radio in 
question. Nonetheless, I will stick with this example in what follows. So far as I can 
see, nothing of substance hangs on this choice of example. 
 
10 ‘Car-plus’ and ‘car-minus’ are intended to be singular referring terms, not disguised 
descriptions. 
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exists after losing its radio, and is identical with car-minus. So by 
transitivity of identity, car-plus and car-minus are identical, and so (ID) is 
true.  
 On the other hand, there is also reason to think that (ID) is false. For 
consider: car-plus has a property, namely having a radio, that car-minus 
lacks. But according to Leibniz’ Law, for all objects x and y, if x is 
identical with y then x and y share all their properties. More formally: 
 
(LL) For all objects x, y, and for all properties F, x = y only if Fx iff Fy. 
 
But then, since car-plus has the property of having a radio while car-minus 
lacks the property of having a radio, car-plus cannot be identical with car-
minus, and (ID) is false. 
 We have therefore derived a contradiction from our intuitively 
plausible principles (P), (E), and (LL): it is both the case that car-plus and 
car-minus are identical with each other, and the case that car-plus and car-
minus are not identical with each other. The problem of temporary 
intrinsics is best understood, I think, as the claim that (P), (E), and (LL), 
each independently plausible, together form an inconsistent triad. 
 
3. What is to be done? One response is to claim that (P) is false: no 
objects persist through change. But this response should strike us as very 
implausible. After all, can it really be said that if my car loses its radio I 
have new object? Perhaps it can. Strictly speaking, somebody might say, 
upon the loss of its radio I do indeed have a new car; while loosely 
speaking upon the loss of its radio I have my old car, albeit with different 
properties. On this view, the question whether to retain (P) is a case of 
semantic indecision: it depends on whether we wish to speak strictly or 
loosely. I will simply state, without argument, that this seems to me to be 
an unattractive way to resolve the problem of temporary intrinsics. 
Consequently, I think that this sort of response should be viewed as a last 
resort. 
Another response is to deny (E). But again, it is hard to see how we 
could deny (E) and still maintain the intuition that objects sometimes 
undergo changes in their properties. After all, (E) seems to follow from the 
very meaning of the word ‘change’: for to say that something changes is to 
say that some thing, some one and the same thing, comes to lose or acquire 
a property. 
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Finally, we might deny (LL). But this strikes me as extremely ill 
advised. For do we really want to suggest that a solution to the problem of 
temporary intrinsics requires a rejection of a fundamental logical principle? 
It seems to me that we do not. Consequently, it seems to me that we really 
do need a solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics that retains each 
of (P), (E), and (LL). Is such a solution available? 
 
4. It might be thought that such a solution is obviously available. For 
anybody who has thought about the problem of temporary intrinsics will 
realize at once that what has been ignored is time. Indeed, I presented the 
problem of temporary intrinsics in a largely atemporal manner: my car has 
a radio; my car lacks a radio; so my car both has and does not have a radio. 
However, it would be more appropriate to say that my car both had and 
does not have a radio. Moreover, it might be argued that this is all that is 
required to solve the problem of temporary intrinsics. For since there is 
arguably no incompatibility between a thing’s having a property at one 
time and lacking it at another, it might seem that the problem of temporary 
intrinsics is no problem at all. 
 But like many others, I think that this response will not do. For 
merely to point out that my car had a property that it now lacks does not 
solve the problem of temporary intrinsics; it merely redescribes it. As 
David Lewis puts it,  
 
[i]t is not a solution [to the problem of temporary intrinsics] just to say how 
very commonplace and indubitable it is that we have different [properties] at 
different times. To say that is only to insist—rightly—that it must be possible 
somehow. Still less is it a solution to say it in jargon—as it might be, that bent-
on-Monday and straight-on-Tuesday are compatible because they are ‘time-
indexed properties’—if that just means that, somehow, you can be bent on 
Monday and straight on Tuesday. (Lewis 1986, 204)  
 
The question is not whether time should be integrated into our solution to 
the problem, but rather how time should be integrated into our solution to 
the problem. And the answer to this question is far from obvious. 
 Consider a time t at which the sentence ‘My car has a radio’ is true. 
What is the underlying logical form of this sentence? A number of 
different proposals suggest themselves, but I will focus on two: 
 
(i) My car has-at-t a radio. 
(ii) My car-at-t has a radio. 
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Proposal (i)—which I will call relationalism—holds that so-called intrinsic 
properties are disguised relations. According to relationalism, in other 
words, the property of having a radio is a two-place relation that holds 
between my car and a time. Thus, according to relationalism objects do not 
have properties simpliciter; rather, objects have properties at, or in relation 
to, times.  
Proposal (ii), on the other hand—which I will call the temporal part 
response—holds that ordinary objects undergo changes in intrinsic 
properties in virtue of having as parts temporal parts which themselves 
have properties. Let us turn to discussion of this response. 
 
5. The temporal part response is favored by a number of philosophers, 
among them Cartwright (1975), Armstrong (1980), Quine (1981), Lewis 
(1986), Sider (1997), and Heller (1999). Proponents of the temporal part 
response often explain it by saying that according to it objects perdure 
through change, but do not endure through change. For ease of exposition, 
let us adopt this terminology: 
 
something persists iff, somehow or other, it exists at various times; this is the 
neutral word. Something perdures iff it persists by having different temporal 
parts, or stages, at different times, though no one part of it is wholly present at 
more than one time; whereas it endures iff it persists by being wholly present at 
more than one time. (Lewis 1986, 202) 
 
Of course, it is one thing to talk about temporal parts and temporal stages, 
or about objects being wholly present at different times; it is another thing 
to make this talk comprehensible. Consequently, the next thing we need to 
do is to try to explain what a temporal part is. Unfortunately, this is by no 
means an easy task.  
 For example, it might be supposed that a part P of an object O is a 
temporal part of O if P is a part of O at one time and is not a part of O at 
another time. But consider poor Jerry, who lost his finger in a wood-
chopping accident as a child. According to this definition of ‘temporal 
part’ Jerry’s finger is a temporal part of Jerry, since there is a time—
namely before the wood-chopping accident—at which Jerry’s finger is part 
of him, and another time—namely after the wood-chopping accident—at 
which Jerry’s finger is not part of him. But I think that this is not what 
friends of the MTP have in mind when they talk about temporal parts.  
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 Temporal parts are sometimes introduced on analogy with spatial 
parts. So, for example, just as highway 101 has different spatial parts, some 
located at or near San Francisco, others at or near Santa Rosa, so too it is 
argued that ordinary objects have different temporal parts, some located at 
or near some times, others at or near other times. As Theodore Sider puts 
it, “[a] road has spatial parts in the subregions of the region of space it 
occupies; likewise, an object that exists in time has temporal parts in the 
various subregions of the total region of time it occupies.” (Sider 1997, 
197) Similarly, Mark Heller remarks that “[i]nsofar as time is just one 
more dimension, roughly alike in kind to the three spatial dimensions, we 
should expect that our claims about object’s spatial characteristics have 
analogues with respect to its temporal characteristics.” (Heller 1999, 314) 
The analogy is not perfect, of course, since prima facie at least, there are 
many ways in which the spatial and temporal dimensions diverge. For 
example, time appears to have a direction of flow, whereas space does not, 
and temporal units of measurement are quite different from spatial units of 
measurement. Still, we can make the spatial-temporal analogy a bit more 
precise if we help ourselves to the notion of a region of space, and to the 
notion of a stretch of time. 
 First, regions of space. Following Cartwright (1975), let us say that a 
region of space is a set of points of space. Such regions of space might also 
be called ‘places’. Second, stretches of time. A stretch of time T is any 
interval of moments of time t1, t2, ... tn where t is a moment of time if t has 
no temporal duration, and where for any two moments of time t and t’, 
either t occurs before t’ or t’ occurs before t. If a stretch of time T has no 
temporal duration, we will say that T is a moment of time. 
 We can now define the predicate ‘__ is a temporal part of …’. 
Following Thomson (1983), let us define this predicate as follows: suppose 
y exists through a stretch of time T that begins at t0 and ends at tn. Then x 
is a temporal part of y iff x comes into existence after t0 and goes out of 
existence before tn and x occupies some region of the space occupied by y 
for all of the time that x exists. I will assume that such a definition, or one 
very much like it, is something to which the MTP is committed. 
 With these distinctions in hand, philosophers often go on to 
distinguish three-dimensionalism from four-dimensionalism. Three-
dimensionalism constitutes what I take to be our commonsense view of the 
nature of material objects. According to it, material objects persist through 
time by being wholly present at every moment at which they exist. Four-
dimensionalism, on the other hand, is the view that material objects persist 
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through time by having as parts temporal parts which exist at some times, 
but not at others. The MTP is therefore a version of four-dimensionalism.11 
 
6. So much by way of stage setting; let us return to the question of how 
the MTP purports to solve the problem of temporary intrinsics. Recall the 
problem: the intuitively plausible principles (P), (E), and (LL) together 
form an inconsistent triad, since they appear to entail both that (ID) is true, 
and that (ID) is false. But according to the MTP, this is a mistake. For 
according to the MTP, ‘car-plus’ and ‘car-minus’ pick out different 
entities: ‘car-plus’ picks out one temporal part of the four-dimensional 
object that is my car, and ‘car-minus’ picks out a distinct temporal part of 
that same four-dimensional object. Thus, the MTP claims that (ID) is 
simply false, and hence, that no contradiction results from the conjunction 
of (P), (E), and (LL). 
 Despite the attractiveness of this solution, however, it seems to me to 
face serious problems. In particular, I will argue that it faces the following 
dilemma: either it entails that objects that have temporary properties do not 
have them intrinsically; or it entails that objects that have intrinsic 
properties do not have them temporarily. In other words, I will argue that 
the MTP provides a solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics only by 
denying that there are any temporary intrinsics. This conclusion may be 
something that friends of the MTP can learn to live with. I will argue, 
however, that they can do so only by acknowledging that a standard MTP 
objection to relationalism fails. In the end, then, it seems to me that friends 
of the MTP must either acknowledge a fundamental problem with the 
MTP, and with its proposed solution to the problem of temporary 
intrinsics, or they must acknowledge that the temporal part response to the 
problem of temporary intrinsics provides no reason for thinking that the 
MTP is true. In the next sections I will try to make these general 
complaints a bit more precise. 
 
                                                          
11 This terminology is not entirely free from problems, and leaves a number of issues 
unaddressed. For one thing, the phrase ‘three-dimensionalism’ suggests that ordinary 
material objects lack a temporal dimension, and this is false if it is intended to mean 
that ordinary material objects lack temporal extension or duration. For another thing, it 
is unclear what it means for an object to be wholly present at every moment at which it 
exists. Still, I find the terminology to be familiar and  useful, and I will make use of it 
in what follows. 
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7. The conclusion that the MTP entails that there are no temporary 
intrinsics is best argued for, I believe, if we shift to the formal mode. 
Consider the following sentence-schema: 
 
(1) O has P at t, and O lacks P at t’. 
 
Here ‘O’ is a variable ranging over ordinary material objects, and ‘P’ a 
variable ranging over intrinsic properties of ordinary material objects. 
Thus, (1) is to be read as saying that the material object O has an intrinsic 
property P at one time, but not at another. 
 Again, any solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics must 
show how it is possible for some sentences having the same form as (1) to 
be true. Now, according to the MTP an ordinary material object O has an 
intrinsic property P at time t if, first, O has at t a temporal part TP; and 
second, TP has P. And according to the MTP an ordinary material object 
has an intrinsic property P at a time t1 and not at another time t2 if O has 
different temporal parts TP1 and TP2—TP1 existing at t1, and TP2 
existing at t2—such that TP1 has P and TP2 lacks P. So according to the 
MTP, if a sentence having the same form as (1) is true, it must be made 
true by the truth of a sentence having the same form as (2): 
 
(2) O has a temporal part TP1 at t1, and TP1 has P, and O has a temporal 
part TP2 at t2, and TP2 lacks P. 
 
But it now appears that according to the MTP if some sentences having the 
same form as (1) are true, then no properties of ordinary material objects 
are intrinsic properties; or no sentences having the same form as (1) are 
true. Equivalently, in the material mode: according to the MTP either 
intrinsic properties are disguised relations, and so are not temporary 
intrinsics after all, or no intrinsic properties are ever had temporarily, and 
so are not temporary intrinsics. 
 Why do I say this? To see why, let us ask what sorts of material 
objects the variable ‘O’ ranges over in (1) and (2). There are two possible 
options for the friend of the MTP. Either ‘O’ ranges over four-dimensional 
objects, or ‘O’ ranges over temporal parts. Suppose ‘O’ ranges over four-
dimensional objects. Then if a sentence having the same form as (1) is true 
it follows that if an object O has a property P, P is not an intrinsic property 
of O. For according to the MTP, to say that an object O has a property P is 
to say, first, that there is a temporal part TP that has P; and second, that O 
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bears a certain relation to TP. In other words, a sentence like (1) can be 
true only if O bears some relation to a temporal part which has P. Thus, on 
the assumption that ‘O’ ranges over four-dimensional objects, and on the 
assumption that no property the having of which depends on the existence 
of another object can be an intrinsic property, no ordinary material object 
ever has an intrinsic property. 
 Suppose, on the other hand, that the variable ‘O’ in (1) ranges over 
temporal parts. Then although it is plausible to suppose that the properties 
picked out by ‘P’ in (1) are intrinsic properties, it is also arguable that all 
sentences having the same form as (1) are false. This is because it is 
arguable that no temporal part can have a property P at one time and lack P 
at another time. And this is because it is arguable that temporal parts are 
such that if a temporal part has a property at any time at which it exists, it 
has that property at all times at which it exists. Thus, if ‘O’ ranges over 
temporal parts, then no properties had by temporal parts are temporary 
properties. 
 Evidently, this objection depends crucially on the principle that 
temporal parts have their properties essentially, and I do not know how to 
defend this claim. Seizing on my ignorance, friends of the MTP will 
perhaps object that a temporal part can have a property P at one time and 
yet lack P at another. Perhaps; as I said, I do not know how to show that 
this claim is false. However, even if this assumption is granted, it is of no 
help in the present context. For temporal parts were appealed to in an 
attempt to show how it is possible for ordinary material objects to have 
properties at some times and lack them at others. But it is of no help to be 
told that what makes this possible is that temporal parts can have 
properties at some times and yet lack them at others. After all, that is 
precisely the problem we are trying to address. Is the friend of the MTP 
going to claim that temporal parts have temporal parts? If so, the same 
objections that were directed against the MTP’s original solution to the 
problem of temporary intrinsics can be directed against such a proposal. Is 
the friend of the MTP going to claim that it is a brute and inexplicable fact 
that temporal parts can gain and lose properties? This simply trades one 
puzzle for another. 
 The present objection to the MTP can therefore be put as follows: 
either the variable ‘O’ in (1) and (2) ranges over four-dimensional objects, 
or it ranges over temporal parts. If ‘O’ ranges over four-dimensional 
objects, then if any sentence having the same form as (1) is true, this can 
only be because no properties had by the objects over which ‘O’ ranges are 
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intrinsic properties. On the other hand, if ‘O’ ranges over temporal parts, 
then no sentence having the same form as (1) is true, since no properties 
had by the objects over which ‘O’ ranges are had only temporarily. Either 
way, the MTP fails to provide a solution to the problem of temporary 
intrinsics, since it denies that there are any temporary intrinsics. 
 
8. So far as I can tell, there are two lines of response open to a friend of 
the MTP. First, she can argue that the conclusion of the above argument 
does not follow from its premises: contrary to what I have argued, the MTP 
does not entail that no ordinary object ever has an intrinsic property only 
temporarily. Alternatively, she can grant the conclusion of the above 
argument, but argue that it does not present a problem for the MTP’s 
proposed solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics. I will suggest that 
neither response is satisfactory 
 Let us consider the first response. How might this response proceed? 
It is unlikely that a friend of the MTP will take the variable ‘O’ in (1) and 
(2) to range over temporal parts, since what we are concerned with are 
ordinary material objects, and not their temporal parts (if indeed they have 
any). Let us therefore take the variable ‘O’ in (1) and (2) to range over 
four-dimensional objects. Then where I say that if an object O has a 
property P, O has P only derivatively, and hence, that where ‘P’ ranges 
over intrinsic properties of material objects no sentence of the form ‘O has 
property P at t’ is true, the friend of temporal parts can say that a sentence 
of the form ‘O has property P at t’ is true just in case O has a temporal part, 
and that temporal part has P. Thus, this first response amounts to the claim 
that all it means for an ordinary material object—here understood to be 
four-dimensional in nature—to have an intrinsic property P is for that 
object to have a temporal part which has P. 
 Clearly, the viability of this response will depend on answers to two 
questions. First, is it plausible to suppose that an object x might have a 
property P in virtue of a distinct object y having P? And second, is it 
plausible to suppose that an object x might have an intrinsic property P in 
virtue of a distinct object y having P?  
 First question first. I think it should be granted that the idea that an 
object might have a property P in virtue of another object having P is not 
implausible. For example, it is plausible to suppose that what makes it the 
case that my car has a scratch is the fact that it has a door that has a 
scratch. Since the door of my car is not identical with my car, this is 
arguably a case of one object—namely my car—having a property in virtue 
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of another object—namely my car’s door—having that same property. 
Thus, our first question should be answered in the affirmative: an object 
can have a property P in virtue of a distinct object having P. 
 What about the question whether an object might have an intrinsic 
property P in virtue of a distinct object having P? Here I think there is 
trouble. For on the face of it the idea that an object x might have an 
intrinsic property P in virtue of standing in a relation to a distinct object y 
that has P seems incoherent: after all, if P is intrinsic, then x should be able 
to have P regardless of its relation to y, or indeed to any other object. 
Recall our definition of an intrinsic property: a property P is an intrinsic 
property of an object x if x’s having P does not entail the existence of a 
distinct and contingently existing object y. And as we have seen, in the 
case of four-dimensional objects and temporal parts, a four-dimensional 
object can only have a property P in virtue of having a temporal part that 
has P. What this suggests is that if intrinsic properties are properties which 
can be had by an object regardless of what is the case with any other 
object, then the MTP does away with intrinsic properties altogether, 
replacing them with relations instead. Granted, these relations are not 
relations to times, but are instead relations to temporal parts, but the point 
remains the same. 
 I conclude, then, that this first response is unsuccessful. For on the 
assumption that ordinary material objects have properties in virtue of 
bearing relations to temporal parts, it follows that no ordinary material 
object ever has an intrinsic property. 
 
9. Let us turn now to the second response I mentioned above. This 
second response allows that the MTP entails that ordinary material objects 
do not have intrinsic properties, but insists that the sense in which this is 
true is not objectionable and hence, that the MTP is not objectionable as a 
solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics.  
 In order to evaluate this response we need to compare the temporal 
part response with relationalism. As I am using the term, relationalism is 
the view that objects have properties in virtue of being related to different 
times. So, for example, some objects are-at-t red; others are-at-t’ red; and 
so on.12 And what this means is that the property of being red is not a one-
                                                          
12 Again, recall that relationalism is the view that the instantiation relation is 
relativized to times. I don’t mean to suggest, however, that according to relationalism 
expressions like ‘is-at-t red’ are fused predicates, that they have no semantic or 
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place relation that takes a single object as argument, but is rather a two-
place relation that takes as argument both an object and a time. Now 
according to the MTP, relationalism is objectionable as a solution to the 
problem of temporary intrinsics because it counts properties as two-place 
relations. David Lewis, for example, remarks that according to 
relationalism, 
 
all [temporary intrinsics] must be reinterpreted as relations that something with 
an absolutely unchanging intrinsic nature bears to different times. The solution 
to the problem of temporary intrinsics is that there aren’t any temporary 
intrinsics. This is simply incredible, if we are speaking of the persistence of 
ordinary things… If we know what shape is, we know that it is a property, not a 
relation. (Lewis 1986, 204) 
 
Mark Hinchliff echoes Lewis, saying that relationalism “denies our 
intuition that the shapes are properties. Any sort of change on this theory 
involves relations not properties… In effect, [relationalism] denies that an 
object can undergo any sort of change in its properties.” (Hinchliff 1996, 
121) So according to Lewis and Hinchliff, relationalism entails that so-
called properties are really disguised relations, and so denies the possibility 
of genuine change.  
 As against this, however, there are two things to be said. First, 
despite what Lewis and Hinchliff say, I intuit no such thing about the 
nature of properties. That is, I do not know that shape is a property rather 
than a relation. This is not to say that I have no intuitions about the nature 
of properties so-called. For I do have the following intuition: if being bent, 
say, is an n-place relation, then being more bent than is an n+1 place 
relation. That is, while I do not have any strong intuitions about whether or 
not being bent is a property or a relation, I do have the intuition that being 
bent is a fewer-placed relation than is being more bent than. And this, I 
suggest, is all we have to go on. 
 It is true, of course, that in natural language we distinguish properties 
from relations: we call being bent, being round, being red, and so on, 
properties; and we call being more bent than, being rounder than, and 
being more red than relations. However, this settles nothing as it stands. 
For we can agree with this observation and maintain both that being bent, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
syntactic structure. I simply want to emphasize the fact that according to relationalism, 
the instantiation relation is what is being temporally modified. 
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being round, being red, and so on are relations, and that they are different 
from being more bent than, being rounder than, and being more red than. 
For we can insist that what we ordinarily call a property is simply a two-
place relation, and that the difference between properties and relations so-
called is that for any so-called property you take, and for any so-called 
relation you take, the so-called property will always be a fewer-placed 
relation than the so-called relation in question. So the first thing to be said 
in response to Lewis and Hinchliff is that their intuitions are merely that.13  
 The second, and more important, thing to be said against Lewis and 
Hinchliff is this: suppose that Lewis and Hinchliff are right, and that if we 
know what shape is we know that it is a property, not a relation. How is 
this supposed to help the friend of the MTP? It will help the friend of the 
MTP only if the MTP entails that shape is a property, and not a relation. 
But if, as I have argued, the MTP also entails that shape is a relation, then 
this objection to relationalism applies equally well to the MTP. Again, a 
dilemma presents itself: either it is incredible to think that shape is a 
relation, or it is not incredible to think that shape is a relation. If it is 
incredible to think that shape is a relation, then the MTP is open to the 
same objection that relationalism is open to. And if it is not incredible to 
think that shape is a relation, then Lewis’s and Hinchliff’s observation does 
not constitute an objection to relationalism in the first place.  
 
10. Faced with this dilemma, I think it is clear that friends of the MTP 
should insist that relationalism’s characteristic claim—that an object’s 
having a property depends on its being related to a time—is objectionable 
in a way that the MTP’s claim that an object’s having a property depends 
on its being related to a temporal part is not. Our definition of ‘intrinsic’ 
went as follows: a property P is an intrinsic property of an object x if x’s 
having P does not depend on the existence of a distinct and contingently 
existing object y. So we can ask: is a temporal part TP of an object O 
distinct from O? And relatedly, does the MTP really make properties into 
disguised relations? If these two questions are answered in the negative, 
then there will be reason to think that the MTP is not objectionable as a 
response to the problem of temporary intrinsics. 
 Consider the question whether a temporal part TP of an object O is 
an object which is distinct from O. Temporal parts, although not identical 
                                                          
13 I am not claiming that either Lewis or Hinchliff intends this observation to be a 
knockdown refutation of relationalism. Intuitions are, after all, only intuitions. 
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with the four-dimensional objects of which they are parts, are yet not 
discrete from those objects either. Rather, one is quite literally a part of the 
other. So although it is true that the MTP entails that ordinary objects have 
properties in virtue of being related to temporal parts which have 
properties, it might be thought that the relation between the object and its 
temporal parts is sufficiently intimate to temper the charge that the MTP 
makes properties into relations.  
 Nonetheless, I think that this response will not do. Recall Lewis’s 
remark that the problem with relationalism is that according to it temporary 
intrinsics ‘must be reinterpreted as relations that something with an 
absolutely unchanging intrinsic nature bears to different times’. But 
equally, it would seem that according to the MTP temporary intrinsics 
must be reinterpreted as relations that something with an absolutely 
unchanging intrinsic nature bears to different temporal parts. According to 
the MTP, a four-dimensional object acquires and loses the property of 
being red, say, in virtue of gaining and losing a temporal part that is red. 
Again, it is hard to discern any important difference between relationalism 
and the MTP on this count. 
 To this it might be objected that this objection misconstrues the 
relation temporal parts bear to the objects of which they are a part. For it 
might be argued that if TP is a temporal part of an object O, then 
necessarily TP exists and is a part of O. For if an object O is a sum of 
temporal parts, then O depends for its existence on that sum of temporal 
parts and thus, if O exists, then necessarily its parts exist. And given our 
definition of ‘intrinsic property’, namely, that a property P is an intrinsic 
property of an object x if x’s having P does not depend on the existence of 
a distinct and contingently existing object y, it might be thought to follow 
on the MTP that ordinary objects can have intrinsic properties. But again, 
it seems to me that this objection is misguided. For it is not clear that if TP 
is a part of an object O, then TP is necessarily a part of O. For consider 
some candidate four-dimensional object, say Descartes.14 On this view, 
Descartes could not have existed for a shorter period of time than he did 
exist for. For suppose Descartes could have existed for a shorter period of 
time than he did exist for. According to the MTP, this could only be 
because a temporal part that was in fact a part of Descartes might not have 
been a part of him. But if objects have their temporal parts necessarily, 
then Descartes could not have lacked any temporal part that he in fact had, 
                                                          
14 The following argument was suggested by van Inwagen (1990). 
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and so could not have existed for a shorter period of time than he did exist 
for. And this strikes me as highly implausible.  
 What about the question whether the MTP makes properties into 
disguised relations? I have been arguing that since the MTP entails that an 
ordinary object’s having of a property depends on that object’s bearing a 
relation to a temporal part, the MTP entails that so-called intrinsic 
properties of ordinary material objects are in fact relations. But there is an 
obvious response to this claim, viz., that while it is perhaps true that the 
MTP entails that the properties had by ordinary material objects are 
relations, this is compatible with the claim that the properties had by 
temporal parts are intrinsic. For example, if temporal parts have their 
properties essentially, then they have those properties regardless of their 
relations to other objects. And this means that those properties are intrinsic 
properties of the temporal parts. So it might be thought that the MTP is 
compatible with the existence of intrinsic properties after all.  
 I should note at the outset that it is unclear why the claim that 
temporal parts might have intrinsic properties would make us less worried 
about the nature of the properties had by ordinary material objects since, 
after all, what we are primarily concerned with are ordinary material 
objects and their properties. Still, if we set this worry aside, this seems to 
be a fair objection. Unfortunately, I’m not sure how to respond to it, since 
as I’ve said, I’m not sure how to answer questions concerning the modal 
properties of temporal parts. For example, consider a temporal part TP 
which comes into existence at a time t and goes out of existence at a later 
time t’, and which is gray and square. Could TP have come into existence 
at a time earlier than t? Could TP have existed for a longer or shorter 
stretch of time? Could TP have been red and circular instead of gray and 
square? I have no idea about how to begin addressing these questions.  
 Moreover, this sort of response is open to the following rejoinder. 
One would naturally assume that if an ordinary material object O has a 
property P in virtue of having as a part a temporal part TP which itself has 
P, then the property P had by O is the same property as that had by TP. But 
on this response, this assumption is mistaken. For the property P had by O 
is a relational property, whereas the property P had by TP is an intrinsic 
property, and it is hard to see how one and the same property could be both 
intrinsic and relational. 
Perhaps this is not a genuine worry; perhaps it merely points to an 
ambiguity in the language we use to attribute so-called properties to 
objects. For example, it might be argued that when we use the predicate ‘is 
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red’ to attribute an intrinsic property to an ordinary material object O, what 
we attribute to O is instead a relation, whereas when we use the predicate 
‘is red’ to attribute a property to a temporal part TP, we succeed in 
attributing a genuine intrinsic property to TP. This sort of hybrid view 
doesn’t strike me as obviously wrong, but it does strike me as being very 
unattractive. For the predicate ‘is red’ does not appear to be ambiguous in 
the way in which the predicate ‘is a bank’ is ambiguous. 
Although these remarks are inconclusive, I nonetheless conclude that 
this second response fares no better than the first. For since the MTP 
entails that an ordinary object’s having a property involves that object 
bearing a relation to a temporal part, the MTP entails that the properties 
had by ordinary objects are relational rather than intrinsic. And the 
observation that temporal parts can have properties non-derivatively would 
not appear to affect this fact. 
 
11. Where does this leave us? I first argued that the MTP faces a 
dilemma: either the MTP entails that no ordinary material object ever has a 
property only temporarily, or the MTP entails that the properties had by 
ordinary material objects are disguised relations, and so are not intrinsic. I 
then suggested that there are two responses open to friends of the MTP: 
either they can deny that the MTP entails that properties are disguised 
relations; or they can grant this, but argue that this is not a problem for the 
MTP. The first sort of response was found unconvincing, given our 
definition of ‘intrinsic property’. And the second response was also 
rejected on the grounds that the MTP fares no better than relationalism on 
this score. 
 But the question remains: what is an adequate solution to the 
problem of temporary intrinsics, and what would such a solution tell us 
about the nature of material objects? The answers to these questions will 
depend on whether one thinks that properties can be relations. If you are of 
the opinion that any view that counts properties as relations must be false, 
then it seems to me that you must reject relationalism along with the MTP, 
and look for some other solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics. On 
the other hand, if you are not convinced that turning properties into 
relations is in and of itself reason to reject an account of the metaphysics of 
material objects, then you are free to endorse either relationalism or the 
MTP.  
 For the reasons given above, I am not convinced that turning 
properties into relations is sufficient reason for rejecting an account of the 
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metaphysics of material objects. However, I incline towards the view that 
ordinary material objects are three-dimensional in nature, that they persist 
by being wholly present at every moment at which they exist, and that they 
gain and lose properties by bearing relations to different times. Granted, 
this requires the rejection of some pre-theoretical views about the nature of 
material objects; but the MTP also forces us to abandon certain of our pre-
theoretical views. For in addition to committing its proponents to the 
existence of temporal parts, the MTP also entails that properties are 
disguised relations. In the end, then, it seems to me that the MTP forces us 
to abandon too many of our pre-theoretical intuitions about the nature of 
material objects, and so represents a misguided account of the metaphysics 
of ordinary material objects. 
 There are a number of important issues that I have not addressed in 
this paper. My aim, however, has not been to consider every argument for 
or against the MTP. Rather, my aim has been to suggest that the MTP 
provides a solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics only by denying 
the existence of properties that are both temporary and intrinsic. And the 
conclusion I drew from this was conditional: if the MTP provides an 
adequate response to the problem of temporary intrinsics, then the MTP 
provides no reason to reject our commonsense view of the nature of 
material objects. Thus, it seems to me that we are better off looking away 
from the MTP, and towards some version of three-dimensionalism, for an 
account of the nature of material objects. 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The problem of temporary intrinsics is the problem of how objects can persist through 
change. A popular line of thought holds that if the Metaphysic of Temporal Parts—or 
the MTP, for short—is adopted, then the problem of temporary intrinsics can be 
adequately resolved. On this view, the problem of temporary intrinsics and the MTP 
are linked, at least in the following sense: the MTP provides a solution to the problem 
of temporary intrinsics, and so gives us reason for thinking that the MTP is true. In this 
paper I argue this line of reasoning is flawed. I consider an objection that friends of the 
MTP press against other solutions to the problem of temporary intrinsics and turn it 
against the MTP itself. The conclusion I draw is therefore conditional: if the MTP 
provides an adequate response to the problem of temporary intrinsics, then the MTP 
provides no reason to reject our commonsense view of the nature of material objects. 
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